Why Swiss family offices underweight India — and what is changing

In conversations with Swiss single-family and multi-family offices over the past 18 months, a consistent pattern emerges: global-emerging-markets allocations range from 3 to 7 percent of total AUM, but the explicit India line inside that bucket rarely exceeds 1 percent. Most of the MSCI-EM exposure routes through broad index funds where India sits at 18-20 percent weight, making the effective India exposure closer to 0.5 to 1.5 percent. For the world’s fifth-largest economy, that is under-allocated against almost any forward-looking scenario. The interesting question is why.

Four historical reasons — each with a shifting underlying driver

1. Currency depreciation eating nominal returns

For two decades the Indian rupee depreciated at roughly 3-4 percent annually against the Swiss franc, turning double-digit INR growth into mid-single-digit CHF returns. That trade-off discouraged patient capital. What has changed: the rupee has stabilised significantly in the post-2020 period, helped by tighter Indian macro management, larger FX reserves, and steady export growth. Swiss franc-denominated returns are catching up with the local growth story for the first time in a generation.

2. Governance and disclosure concerns in Indian private markets

Family offices that have looked at Indian private equity in the past often hit the same wall: related-party transactions, opaque holding structures, promoter-family dynamics that change outside the PE documentation. This is real and has not disappeared. What has changed: the quality of institutional GPs investing in India has risen materially, IPO-ready companies are following stricter SEBI standards, and the top domestic fund managers now run processes comparable to their European peers. The diligence premium is still required; the unbridgeable gap is smaller.

3. Lack of direct access paths from Switzerland

Traditionally, a Swiss family office wanting Indian exposure had three bad options: (a) MSCI-India ETF with high passive fees and no alpha, (b) a handful of Anglo-Saxon EM funds where India was a sleeve, or (c) a cold attempt to invest into Indian GPs with minimal local referencing. What has changed: TEPA’s investment chapters, combined with a growing community of India-focused GPs raising from Europe, has opened a third lane: co-invest alongside identified India GPs or DACH-based India-focused vehicles, with clearer legal protection.

4. No reputational pull in Switzerland

Swiss UHNW and family-office culture is deeply referral-driven. Allocations to the US (particularly Silicon Valley VC), Germany, and select European tech funds happen partly because peer offices hold them and the conversation is easy at dinners. India has historically been the opposite: few peer references, risk of being the first in a circle to write a cheque. What has changed: the number of Swiss and DACH LPs quietly building positions in Indian Climate Tech, Infrastructure, and Growth Equity over the past 24 months has crossed a critical threshold. The conversation is now possible.

Where the allocation probably ends up

None of this argues that Swiss family offices should suddenly move to 10 percent India exposure. That would be irresponsible. The more defensible argument is that the current 1 percent is too low for a country representing 18 percent of global population, 4 percent of global GDP (nominal), and the largest forward growth contribution over the next decade. A 2-4 percent explicit allocation, built over 3-5 years through a combination of direct GP commitments and selective co-investment, is a reasonable rebalancing target.

The practical constraint is not thesis-level; it is deal access. The best Indian opportunities are not on global placement agent decks. They are in conversations inside the Indian ecosystem, surfaced through networks that combine Swiss finance credibility with authentic Indian market access. That intersection is narrow, and it is where thoughtful advisory adds real value.

Three practical first steps

For a Swiss family office that has read this and agrees that the status quo is under-allocated, three first steps come to mind:

1. Define the scope thesis before chasing funds. Is the exposure you want primarily Climate Tech (EV, renewables, sustainable materials)? Infrastructure (digital, logistics)? Growth Equity (Series B to pre-IPO B2B and consumer)? These have different return profiles, liquidity horizons, and GP universes. Generic “India exposure” mandates rarely clear investment-committee scrutiny.
2. Meet three Indian GPs before committing to any. Not a single introduction. Three GPs, each in a different segment, ideally with one Swiss-based LP already committed. The goal of the first round is calibration, not commitment. The pattern of what you ask and what they answer teaches you more than the pitch decks.
3. Size the first commitment small. A CHF 2-5 million initial commitment to one India GP, with explicit co-invest rights, is the minimum size that attracts serious attention from quality GPs. Anything smaller dilutes your seat at the table. Anything much larger deserves to be staged after you see first-fund sell-through data.

What TEPA adds to the picture

The EFTA-India Trade and Economic Partnership Agreement (TEPA) committed EFTA states to USD 100 billion of investment into India over 15 years. Most of that will flow through private capital, not state channels. This is a structural tailwind for Swiss GPs building India exposure today: the precedent and legal architecture are being established now, and early participants benefit from cleaner investment-protection provisions. It is not a guarantee, but it changes the asymmetry.

Pullely Consulting advises Swiss family offices and institutional allocators on India-specific deal sourcing and GP introductions, with a background spanning Swisscanto Private Equity (ZKB), Lombard Odier, UBS, and Credit Suisse on the Swiss side and direct network access across Indian fund managers. Get in touch for a confidential conversation about your India allocation thesis.